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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEAVER DAM SALES COMPANY,
a Partnership
Plaintvff-Respondent,

vs.

Case

No. 9653

STANDARD GILSONITE COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF T'HE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to set aside a default judgment
rendered against the appellant and based upon an action
by the plaintiff respondent alleging that the contract

is void, illegal and unenforceable.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted a default judgment on
February 23rd, 1962, and on that same day, the defendant appellant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. Said motion was properly supported by evidence,
which motion was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks vacation of the judgment, and
judgment remanding the case back to the District Court
for trial on its merits.
STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

This case is a companion case having the same issues
of law, heard at the same til'ne and involves substantially
the same parties and it is the defendant appellants contention that it involves the sale of the srune thing for
the first time. These cases should be read therefore
together to disclose that under the agreement between
Beaver Dam Sales v. Standard Gillsonite, the paragraph
entitled Subject it states:
"All of the trademarks, copyrights, patents,
patent application of Beaver Dam relating to the
use of Gilsonite in oil well drilling as a lost
circulation material and the use of Gilsonite in
oil well drilling for any other purpose. (Emphasis
added)
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E. J. 1Iayhew in the companion case referred to
is suing on an agreement made subsequent involving what
is purportedly covered in this agreement. It is disclosed
in the record that Mayhew is a partner in Beaver Dam,
the plaintiff respondent in this case.
A complaint was filed by the plaintiff on January
30th, 1962 alleging that a contract entered into by and
between the plaintiff and defendant September 4th, 1956,
was void unenforceable and illegal and as a second
cause of action that the contract had been breached by
the defendant.
The contract of September 4th, 195,6 was attached
and made a part of the complaint. It is the contention
of the defendant that the contract was entered into in
the presense of counsel for plaintiff and under the
terms of which the plaintiff was to receive as a minimum
royalty per year the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars.
Substantial payments were made under this contract and
great assistance rendered by the defendant in perfecting
plaintiffs patent rights under the contract.
On January 18th, 1962, R. J. Pinder, President of
Standard Gilsonite Company resigned as President of
the corporation by sending formal notices to the existing
director, officers, and substantial stockholders. Th~re
after on February 1st, 1962, a Mr. B. F. Romono personally served R. J. Pinder as officer and President of
the corporation, although at the time of service R. J.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Pinder clearly informed Romono that he was no longer
President, or associated ·with the corporation. At this
time the corporation was without formal management
or authorized leadership whatsoever, and the 3,000 shareholders, most of whom lived out of the State of Utah,
were at the mercy of the Plaintiff seeking to enforce hls
claims against the corporation. On February 16th, 1962,
the firm of Jensen, Jensen & Bradford was contacted by
a group of interested stockholders in order to determine
what could be done to protect the corporation, pending
reorganization. Said counsel attempted to contact R. J.
Pinder and obtain the necessary information with which
to protect the corporation against the complaint herein
involved. That on the 16th day of February, 1962, R. J.
Pinder, in the presence of attorney William Bradford,
contacted by long distance telephone certain shareholders
of the defendant corporation, for the purpose of establishing Jensen, Jensen & Bradford's authority to properly
represent the defendant corporation in the action. Because of the delay in getting the necessary information
from the stockholders in distant parts of the United
States, it was not until February 23rd, 1962 that the necessary information, docun1ents, and authority to actively
enter the law suit were available to the legal counsel.
On February 23rd, 1962, a judgment and decree \Yas
entered in the Third Judicial District Court against the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant. On February 23rd, 1962, the same date on
which the judgment was entered, Jensen, Jensen & Bradford called and as:ked respondent counsel for a chance to
plead, and was denied this, and advised that the default
judgment had been entered a few hours earlier. Immediately Jensen, Jensen & Bradford filed with the Clerk of
the District Court a motion and notice that the default
judgment theretofore entered upon that date, be set
aside. The motion was supported by an affidavit properly
executed by R. J. Pinder, and a mesne assignment by
which patent rights claimed by the plaintiff were assigned
to Halliburton Company by the defendant. On March 7th,
1962, at 2 :30 p.m., the motion was heard. However, it was
continued until ~larch 14th, 1962, at which time, despite
the fact that it was not only apparent that there were
meritorious defenses, but there was also a serious question as to jurisdiction having been obtained over the defendant corporation, the Court denied the defendant's
motion to set aside the judgment. However, it should
be noted that the Court itself comments, at page 16 in
the transcript of Beaver Dam Sales vs. Standard Gilsonite, a companion case, also on appeal at this time, that
the case sho~tld (emphasis added) be placed on the trial
calendar.

A substantially identical case involving the same
primary parties is now before this Court, entitled E. J.
Llf ayhew

vs. Stan-dard Gilsonite Contpany, and it would
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be well to examine the transcript in that case, because
it involves substantially the same testimony and is based
upon the same affidavits and proof as the instant case
and was treated in conjunction with this instant case
by the lower court, and should be so treated now.
STATE~1ENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS IN
ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT SETTING ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
POINT II.

THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THAT
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SERVED.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT BASED UPON FINDINGS OF AN ILLEGAL
CONTRACT, PREPARED BY THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF,
WITH MUTUAL PARTICIPATION, AND STILL ALLOWING
HIM TO RETAIN $54,000.00 IN PROFIT, AND GRANTING
JUDGMENT WHICH RETURNED THE PAT'ENTS WHICH
WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL CONTRACT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS IN
ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT SETTING ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

By the rules in this State, the attitude and policy
relative to the setting aside of a default judgment are
codified with the purpose in mind of guiding the trial
court in the use of its discretion. Quoting in part the
phrases from Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve
a party or his legal repr.esentative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect ... " (Emphasis added.)
Considerable importance should be attached to the
words ''excusable neglect." The definition given to the
word "neglect" in vVebster's Collegiate Dictionary, 5th
Edition, is "to omit to notice, to be remiss in attending
to, or fail to do, care for." This fairly contemplates that
that which has been done, or not done, as in the instant
case, is rmniss to one's responsibilities, but in the interest
of justice and fairness, the law deems it fair to excuse
neglect or failures which are not unreasonably gross.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is further implied and made factual by the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the functions
of which was to remove many of the technical difficulties
involved in pleading, and to avoid the inequities resulting
from a failure to properly adhere to the rather stringent
rules of code pleading, by which, in years gone by, many
law suits were won and lost.
The law in Utah, by the statutes, by the rules, and
by the cases, clearly leans toward the equitable position
and attitude that a case should be heard on its merits.
Our Supreme Court in Bylund v. Crook et al., 208 P. 504,
states at page 505:
"Our trial courts are usually· very liberal in
vacating and setting aside default judgments entered against a defaulting party by reason of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or in case
where there has been fraud or deceit practiced.
Under our practice it is generally regarded as an
abuse of discretion for a trial court not to vacate
and set aside a default judgment when there is
any reasonable grounds for doing so, Oll'l!d timely
appl~cation is made." ( E1nphasis added.)
This statement expresses the policies enumerated
above, and the basic policy of our Supreme Court in dealing with the setting aside of default judgments. In the
case with which we are here concerned, certainly no reasonable person could contend that timely application was
not made for the setting aside of the default judgment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The necessary motion and supporting affidavit, together
with additional documents, were filed on the same date
that the default judgment was entered.
Certainly it is recognized that the moving party
should be diligent and show that he was prevented fron1
avoiding the default judgment because of circumstances
over which he had no control. In this regard, the Court
states in Warren v. D:ixon R.anch Company et al., 260 P.
2d. 741, at page7 43:
''Discretion must be exercised in furtherance
of justice and the court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that a party
may have a hearing: Hurd v. Hurd, 74 Utah 46,
276 Pac. 908. However, the movant must show
that he has use~ due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control. Peterson v. Crozier, 29
Utah 235, 81 P. 860."
The use of the term '~no control" in the foregoing
case, certainly when alined with the phrase "excusable
neglect" fairly implies that the term ''circumstances over
which he had no control" does not mean that the only
thing that will constitute circumstances over which he has
no control would be an act of God, or the term "excusable
neglect" would be meaninglness. It is apparent, in the
instant case, that trial counsel was diligent in attempting
to protect the interest of his client, the defendantSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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appellant herein. As mentioned in the affidavit which is
a part of this record, in paragraph 4 defense counsel indicates that he was unable to obtain readily information
relative to the position of the defendant in this law suit
until February 16th, 1962. Immediately thereafter he
attempted to contact R. J. Pinder, the former President.
After finally getting him into the office, long-distance
telephone calls were made in order to get the necessary
documents, papers and information with which to properly represent the defendant. On the 23rd day of February, 1962, the default judgment was entered. The defense
counsel called plaintiff's counsel to request an opportunity for smne additional time in which to responsively
plead, and was advised that a default judgment had been
entered hours prior, and immediately counsel for the appellant filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It is
certainly not a situation where counsel should be condemned for not taking what is customary action, which is,
in violation of rules and attitudes of the Court of this
state and others, of filing a general denial of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint in order to stall, giving him
sufficient opportunity to obtain the facts. Rather,
defense counsel endeavored to bring before the Court a
legitimate defense but was delayed in obtaining the san1e.

It is to be borne in mind, and certainly brought to
the attention of the Court and to plaintiff-respondent's
counsel, that there were no officers or directors legally
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qualified in the State of Utah, and that of the approximately 3,000 shareholders nearly all of them resided
outside of the State of Utah. There was no active management. There was no one with responsibility to give
orders, and there was no one to whom legal counsel
could turn when decisions had to be made relative to answering and responding in litigation, and no readily available source from which the information could be obtained
to present a meritorious defense.
By the time a reorganization committee was formed
by a group of stockholders to protect the defendant corporation, the default had been entered. Certainly, circumstance·s of the kind herein alleged were considered when
Rule 60 (b) was drafted. Therefore, the Supreme Court
in the instant case, should find that Rule 60(b) is applicable in both sub paragraphs 1 and 7, and that in either
case the trial court, in the equitable and fair use of its
discretion, should have granted the motion for the setting
aside of the default judgment.
In the case of Outler v. Haycock, 90 P. 897, a case
somewhat similar was appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court. In this particular case the plaintiff filed a complaint in an action of replivin. The twenty days for answering expired on December 1st, 1905. On December 1st,
the defendant's attorney mailed a demurrer. The demurrer did not arrive until December 4th because of the slow
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mailing services in the southern part of Utah. On December 2nd the plaintiff's attorney entered a default
judgment. Prior to the entering of the default judgment,
the defendant himself asked the plaintiff's attorney not
to enter a default judgment because his attorney was
preparing the necessary papers and would send him
copies. However, the default was entered. Subsequently,
the defaulted defendant's attorney filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. The Court stated at page 900:
"As has been well said in all doubtful cases
the general rule of courts is to incline towards
granting relief from the default and to bring about
a judgment on the merits."
Continuing on, the Court said at page 900:
"This rule, as appears from the authorities, is
of almost universal application, and is defeated
only in cases where the default is the result of ~11r
excusable neglect of the party in default, or where
it would be inequitable to set it aside." (Emphasis
added.)
The Court then went on to state that the trial court had
abused its discretion in not setting aside the default because of the following reasons:
1. The appellant had n1ade reasonable efforts to
comply with the law. (Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2. ~The case arose 1n a sparcely settled country
where communications were slow. (Note: Even if fast,
would have arrived a day, or at least hours late.)
3. Good faith and reasonable effort to ma$:e a defense are always elements to be considered in each case.
4. There is not the slightest intimation that the
respondent would have suffered either inconvenience or
loss of any kind by setting aside default.
5. This was not a case where a party at great expense and sacrifice of time had prepared for trial and
would be compelled to undergo it all again if the other
party is permitted to defend.
6. It is not a case where any evidence has been lost
to the prevailing party.
Answering point by point the foregoing issues made
in the case of Ctdler v. Haycock and applying them to the
instant case :
1. ·The diligence and reasonable efforts to comply
with the law are apparent.
2.

Although the case did not take place in a sparcely

settled country all of the truly interested parties of the
defendant were over a thousand miles away and many
miles apart in distant areas of the United States.
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3.

Good faith and reasonable efforts to make a de-

fense are present and will be set forth in some detail in
the second and third arguments of this brief.
4.

There is no allegation or intimation that the re-

spondent will suffer great inconvenience or loss by setting aside the default judgment.
5.

There has been no showing that the plaintiff

has gone to any considerable expense or sacrifice in
preparing for trial.
6. There is no indication that by having a trial at a
date subsequent to February 23rd evidence will be lost.
In truth and fact the evidence is largely documentary
and can be entered in evidence at any time. All of the
material witnesses to the case are largely available in
Utah and will be none the less available if this case is
heard on its merits than they were at the time the default
judgment was entered.
1

Quoting again from Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
60 (b):
". . . the n1otion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and
(4), not more than three months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sub paragraph 7 states: "the motion shall be made within a reasonable time" and does not limit it to any particular number of days.
Again, it is important to recognize that the defendant
could not have acted more timely in response to his
default position, for if he had been only several hours
earlier the case would not be before this Court.
In the case of Ney v. Harrison, 5 Ut. 2d 217, 299 P.
2d, 1114, the Court said:
''The statutory authority of trial courts to set
aside judgments obtained by default has been liberally construed to the end that there be trial on
the merits, beginning with our earliest decisions.
In the recent case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
we had occasion to review the policy considerations and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal construction, thus :
'The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a
creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforctng a judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense. '"
(Emphasis added.)
One of the factors considered by the Court in determining whether a default judgment should be set aside
is whether there is a material issue or a defense to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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complaint. In the instant case the affidavit attached to
the motion to set aside the judgment by default specifically enumerates in paragraphs 5 through 14 inclusive,
the defenses which could be raised upon trial. The Court
in Utah Commercial and Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P.
1033, stated at page 1036:
"This raises a material issue, and if true, will
make a good defense. Conspiracy and collusion of
the bank officials with the mortgagors are also set
up with considerable detail. The defense indicated
is clearly meritorious, and, with a record replete
with circumstances indicating that the purpose
and intention was to defend the action on its
merits, would it be reasonable or justifiable to infer that the defendant knowingly and intentionally
neglected his case~"
In the matter at hand it is absurd to assume that
the defendant, having allegedly paid out substantial
sums over a period of five years now desires to sit
idley and allow a judg1nent to be entered whereby patent
positions quite necessary to the operation will be taken
from them.
Continuing on with the case of
Court at page 1036 states:

~: ey

v. Harreson, the

"Such is not the law, and courts do not favor
judgments by default. The policy of the law is that
every man shall have his day in court before the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment shall be entered against him, and where
a judgment by default has been entered, and within the proper time a good defense to the action
in which the judgment is rendered, is made to appear, and it is shown that the default was entered
through excttsable neglect or mistake, the default
will be vacated and the judgment set aside, to permit a trial on the merits." (Emphasis added.)
"The power of the court to set aside the judgments by default is recognized and conferred in
Section 3005, Rev. St. 1898, and should be liberally
exercised for the purpose of directing proceedings
. . . and where the circmnstances which led to default are such as to cause the court to hesitate, it
is better to resolve the doubt in favor of the application, so that a trial may be secured on the
merits."
It cannot be said that the Court did not hesitate in
the case at bar, for as indicated in the Statement of Facts,
the Court in addressing its remarks to the parties, expressly stated, clearly evidencing its hesitation, that this
case should be placed on the trial calendar.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THAT
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SERVED.

Under Rule 4 (e) 4 of the Utah Rule·s of Civil Procedure, the manner of service on a corporation is expressly outlined. It is to be served by the delivering of a copy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the summons and complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
The plaintiff in attempting to secure service upon
Standard Gilsonite Company served R. J. Pinder as an
officer. R. J. Pinder, upon receiving the summons and
complaint, categorically stated that he was not an officer, and that he was not employed by Standard Gilsonite.
The process server, however, under apparent instructions, served him, despite the advice that he was not an
officer, director or employee. Documentary evidence and
testimony as set forth in the affidavit of R. J. Pinder and
attached to the motion to set aside the default judgment,
clearly states that on January 18th, 1962, R. J. Pinder
resigned as an officer and director of Standard Gilsonite
Company. The service of summons was not made until
February 1st, 1962. Certainly, it cannot be contended,
under the circumstances here involved, that the service
of summons and complaint is in valid and proper form.
It would appear that there is no alternative but to insist
that the service was of no legal effect and that jurisdiction was not obtained over Standard Gilsonite Company,
for there is no evidence of any nature whatsoever in any
of the pleadings, to indicate that R. J. Pinde·r was in fact
an officer at the time of the filing of the complaint and
service of the summons. He was served, but he denies
being an officer or director, and judgment is taken
against Standard Gilsonite. At least, it would seem that
there is an issue which should be resolved concerning the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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question of whether or not he was an officer at the time
of service, and the the trial court should allow the introduction of evidence to disprove the affidavit of Mr.
Pinder, rather than to summarily grant a default judgment, and a fortiori, in denying the motion for setting
aside, even on the basis of Rule 4 (e) 4 or Rule 60 (b),
sub section 4.

The trial court commented in this case on the fact
that there was a question in mind of whether the officer,
when he resigned, must notify third parties. The law
on this particular point is clear. At 13 Am. Jur. Sec. 883
at page 867, the law is set forth as follows:

"An officer of a corporation may terminate
his office by resignation if the statutes, charter,
and by-laws imp6se no limitations thereon, and in
doing so, he need not give any notice to the public
or to persons dealing with the corporation. The
fact that a statute requires directors, unless removed, to continue in office until their successors
are appointed does not prevent a director from
resigning at any time. The right of an officer to
resign as regards third persons, however, is not
unqualified, and as against them the motive of a
resignation may render it ineffectual."
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There is not one scintilla of evidence in this file that
R. J. Pinder had any ulterior motive for resigning as an
officer and director of Standard Gilsonite Company, particularly as it relates to the case at hand. There is no
testimony or evidence that R. J. Pinder's resignation was
in any way motivated by any other desire than to simply
get out of Standard Gilsonite, which is at present an
insolvent corporation proceeding under the provisions
of Chapter XI of the Chandler Act. Even if there should
have been testimony or evidence to the effect that Pinder
had indeed an ulterior motive in resigning as an officer
and director of Standard Gilsonite, this would be a question of fact for the court or jury to decide on the basis of
evidence presented before it, and therefore would be another issue to place before the court, and another reason
why this case should not have been defaulted. Certainly
with the record before the court it is apparent that jurisdiction, on the basis of the evidence presented to the
court, had not been obtained over the defendant, and the
court was in error in assuming that under the law, notice
of resignation of an officer and director must be given
to third parties. Acting under misinterpretation and
perhaps misunderstanding of the general rule of law, the
court heard and denied the motion to set aside the default
judgment.
The resignation generally becomes immediately effe'Ctive, unless some provision in the resignation provides
other~ise. Again quoting from 13 Am. J ur. 886 at page
868, it states:
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"According to some authorities, a resignation
by an officer of a corporation takes effect immediately and is not dependent upon the appointment
of a successor in office, even though a by-law provides that the office shall be held until a successor
is appointed. There are authorities, however,
which have taken the view that where the by-laws
provide that a corporate officer shall continue to
hold office until the election of his successor, the
resignation of such an officer does not take effect
until then."
In this particular case, the counsel for the appellant
stipulates that the corporate charter and by-laws provide that an officer shall hold office until a successor is
appointed, but does not provide anything concerning resignations.
There 1s evidence that R.J. Pinder's status as an
officer and director prior to his resignation is perhaps
questionable. If, however, the court ta:lms the position
of accepting the general rule of law, Mr. Pinder's resignation was effective and the service occurred at a time subsequent to his resignation. Again quoting from 13 Am.
Jur., Sec. 885, at page 868:
"Since an officer may resign, as a rule, at
pleasure, no action on the part of the corporation
is essential to make his resignation effectual. Acceptance thereof by the directors or governing
body is not required. \Vhen he tenders his resignation to the proper corporate authorities, to take
effect immediately, the resignation is complete, although it is not acted on by the corporation or
entered in its books."
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In the instant case the letter of resignation was forwarded to all the responsible parties, primarily certain
majority stockholders and the one remaining director,
and all, in fact, who held responsible positions in this
corporation, were notified. Under these circumstances, it
would appear that no one can contend that as a matter
of law the resignation was ineffective. To allow the
default judgment to stand where there is a serious question as to the court having obtained jurisdiction would be
a great injustice.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT BASED UPON FINDINGS OF AN ILLEGAL
CONTRACT, PREPARED BY THE PLAINTIFF IDMSELF,
WITH MUTUAL PARTICIPATION, AND STILL ALLOWING
HIM TO RETAIN SUBSTANTIAL SUMS, AND GRANTING
JUDGMENT WHICH RE'TURNED THE PATENTS WHICH
WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL CONTRACT.

The lower court erred in granting a default judgment
based upon a complaint ·which expressly alleges that the
action is based upon an illegal contract, said contract being prepared with the consent and approval of plaintiff's
own counsel, who is, in fact, named in the agreement,
under the terms of which, over a period of approximately
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four years, the plaintiff received substantial sums and
further the court erred in granting injunctive relief in
instructing the defendant to transfer back to an illegal
contract.
Referring to the judgment and decree entered in this
case, paragraph 2 states:
"The contract entered into between the plaintiff and defendant dated July 2nd, 1958, is illegal,
void and uninforceable."
On the basis of the finding of the contract to be void
and illegal, it is seemingly elementary law stated in the
Latin maxim ex dodo malo non oritur actio, which, freely
translated, means "no court will lend its aid to a man who
found his claim of action upon an immoral or illegal
act."
Quoting from 12 Am. J ur. on Contracts at Sec. 209,
at page 713:

"In other words no action can be based upon
an illegal agreement. The rule rests upon the
broad ground that no court will allow itself to be
used when its judgment will consumate an act
forbidden by law. It has its foundation in the
policy of di~couraging illegal and corrupt agreements by refusing all judicial aid to the parties
to them. This rule applies to any agreement which
is illegal. . . . "
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Generally, limitations on enforcement of rights growing out of legal agreements are applied in cases where
parties are in pari delicto. It should be noted that this
contract has persisted since 1958 and certainly if the contract were illegal, the plaintiff knew, or should have
known, of its character. The contract on its face shows
no apparent illegality, no illegal object is known, and
certainly illegality cannot be presumed or inferred. If
illegal, the plaintiff during the period of time accepted
the rather substantial benefits thereunder, alleged to be
in excess of $50,000.00, and cannot reasonably contend
at this point that he is not in pari delicto, and certainly no evidence was presented to the lower court negating or even alleging that they were not.
It is entirely possible, and only sufficient evidence
will prove, that only the plaintiff who asserts illegality
had :knowledge of the purported illegality and under these
circumstances it is elementary that the courts have a duty
to protect the innocent party and, if necessary, to penalize
the party guilty of attmnpting to accmnplish an :lllegal
objective by entirely legal means.

Certainly if the courts did not punish the guilty party
they would at least require the restitution of the monies
paid.
12 Am. Jur. Sec. 213 states at page 72±:
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"It is son1etimes said that a party to an illegal
agreement will not be permitted to avail himself
of its illegality until he restores to the other party
all that has been received from such party on the
illegal agreement, and that so long as he continues
to enjoy the benefits of the agreement, he will not
be allowed to set up its nullity."
Concluding this aspect of the argument, if it can be
shown that the defendant had no knowledge of the illegal
objective or the illegality of the contract, such sums as
those received by the plaintiff herein, with the \knowledge
of illegality, should be returned to the defendant herein
prior to the maintaining of an action upon an alleged
illegal contract. If, on the other hand, the parties are in
pari delicto, the court should refuse to give any aid or
comfort to either party and accordingly deny any action.
In this case, however, the court granted injunctive relief,
together with an order to the defendant to transfer the
subject of the contract, and a money judgment for costs,
based upon an illegal contract.
It should be noted, however, and perhaps made the
subject of an independent argument, that the judgment
and degree is cmnpletely at odds with any rule of law in
that it on one hand finds the contract void and declares it
as such in paragraph 2, an in paragraph 3 indicates that
if it is not void then it is terminated because of defaults of the defendant. These two provisions cannot
stand together. If a contract is void it cannot be terminSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ated, it cannot be defaulted, if it never existed, and accordingly that judgment and decree is erroneous on its
face.

Quoting from William L. Clark, Jr., in his Handbook
on the Law of Contracts, West Publishing Co., 1931, the
basic rule of law is cited in this general principle:

"To result in a contract, an agreement must
create an obligation; and it does not create an
obligation if it is such that the courts cannot enforce it. An agreement, therefore, which is illegal
or unlawful, is, in fact, no contract at all though
it is often spoken of as an illegal contract."
There is in the findings of fact and conclusions of
law a statement that the court found that Title L5
United States Code and particularly Section 14 thereof:
"It is not within the recollection of those who
were present at the trial nor does the record disclose any evidence present regarding the statutes
that had been violated but rather just general
allegations of illegality. No direct evidence was
presented regarding the subject of illegality and
therefore nothing was presented upon which such
a finding should be based. At least the court
should have required that son1e show of evidence
should be made particularly in light of the general
attitudes involving the require1nents in making
a determination of illegality. (See 12 Am. Jur.
Sec. 150 at page 643.)
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"The illegality of an agreement may he in the
consideration, in a promise, or in its performance.
An agreement to do an illegal act is illegal. U sually the element that destroys the validity of an
agreement is the purpose of the parties to accomplish or to aid an unlawful object. An agreement
which discloses an intention to contravene a statute in fraud of the public or to the injury of
private parties savors of a conspiracy and is
vicious and unenforceable. If such an intention
is once found to exist, the law cannot presume that
the agreement is without the effect intended by the
parties in order to confer upon it the quality of
enforceability.
"It is sometimes stated that the lawfulness of
an agreement is to he measured by what is intended."
The general law being outlined as heretofore, we now
address ourselves to cases in jurisdictions called
upon to decide the issue as it relates to the sufject of
illegality.
In the case of Smith et al. v. California Thorn Cordage, 18 P.2d 393, at page 396, citing DO"menvgoni v. bnperial Live Stock, 189 Cal. 467, 209 P. 36 to 39, the court
said:
"But it does not follow that the plaintiff was
entitled to any relief. The entire transaction was
an attempt to circumvent the law ... In such a case
the court will give no relief even if the point is not
raised by either party."
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and thereafter in the case is a rather thorough analysis
of this subject. Quoting from paragraph 4 of that case
at 39'6, the court said:
"Under the foregoing authorities, where the
parties to an illegal contract are in pari delicto,
the courts will not, on the one hand, undo what
has been done, nor on the other, perfect what has
been left unfinished.''
Quoting again and focusing upon the fact that the
foregoing case raises the problem with which the court
is herein concerned, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of that case,
the court said:
"It may be true that the defendant, John C.
Thorn, is not seeking relief under the terms of
the contract. What he is trying to do is to restore
his own status quo by taking from the other par. ties property which he had· transferred under an
illegal agreement, pursuant to its terms a:r;td conditions, something 'vhich, in this particular action,
is not wholly inequitable, but contrary to the express policy of the law."
And it is contended by the defendant appellant that
by examining the contracts then1selves which are a part
of this record that it will be disclosed that it would
appear on their face that there is some conflict disclosed
as to the relative merits of this case and the companion
case E. J. llfayhew v. St,and-ard Gilsonite for it would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

appear that a partnership in which E. J. ~fayhew is
a partner and had already sold what E. J. Mayhew sold
to the defendant in the companion case and that to
resolve the inequity by the use of a default judgment
rather than to inquire into the merits is to do a substantial injustice to the defendant and to resolve the
defendants interest in questionable transactions in a
manner which makes the court a part of a transaction
subject to some inquiry, at least, and perhaps questionable at least in terms of fairness and perhaps in terms
of legality.

From the foregoing arguments as a matter of law,
the Trial Court erred in granting relief to the plaintiff.
The findings of fact and judgment are stated in the alternative in declaring the contract void and also declaring it
breached. It cannot be both. Further, in the granting of
the judgment on a contract alleged to be illegal which
gives injunctive relief. The contract under which the
plaintiff asserts his rights and cause of action by his own
allegations is adjudged illegal and he has received under
the tenns of that contract and retained the same, substantial sums in benefits, then asks the court to cancel
the contract allowing him to retain the benefits and
retrieve the subject of his illegal bargain.

Defendant for its stockholders petitioned the court
for an opportunity to be heard and it was denied. It is the
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contention of the appellant herein that it is entitled to its
day in court on any one of the three points of this argument.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is submitted:

1.

That the Trial Court has obviously abused its

discretion in not granting the defendant's motion to set
aside the plaintiff's findings of fact and conclusions of
law and default judgment, because the defendant endeavored, with reasonable diligence after being guilty of
excusable neglect, in filing their motion to set aside the
default judgment, and at that time disclosing by affidavit numerous meritorious defenses.

2. That the court never obtained jurisdiction over
the defendant corporation. There are disputed facts in
the record that no officer or authorized agent was served
as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
that the court was mistaken in its understanding of the
effectiveness of the resignation in question, and further
that the plaintiff could properly have served the Secretary of State in accordance with the rules, it being apparent that there was no one upon whom service could
properly be made.
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3. That the judgment here involved is inconsistent
on its face and is based upon a contract which the plaintiff alleges as being illegal. If the contract is illegal as
alleged, the court under law cannot give aid, comfort
or assistance to a party who bases an action upon an
illegal contract. There is no testimony in the record to
indicate that there is anything particularly invalid, illegal or against public policy in this contract. If it were
illegal, then the court should have refused to hear the
case, or in any event, have given no relief whatever. That
deciding the issue of legality or illegality, and the finding
that a party not allowed to be heard is guilty of an illegal agreement, is to conclude that one is guilty of a
crime without evidence and then denying him the opportunity to be heard.
4. That upon equity, reason, logic and good conscience, the appellant herein should prevail under these
facts, and that such a result is supported by the weight
of authority and the cases.
5. That the plaintiff by alleging illegality and stating that the contract was void from the beginning, is
now retaining under the terms of the purported void contract, the substantial sums and certainly, at the very least,
he should be obliged to tender back that which he has received under a void contract, if it is illegal, and the defendant not in par.i delicto.
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6. The trial court erred :in entering its findings of
fact and conclusions of law and judgment in favor of the
respondent, and by denying the defendant's motion to set
aside the default judgment.
Let it therefore follow that the judgment should be
reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court
for a trial on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
BRUCE E. COKE
Counsel for Defendant Appellant
513 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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